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Abstract
We describe a use of formal methods to specify and check a Web Services protocol. The Web Services Atomic Transaction protocol
was specified in TLA+ and checked with the TLC model checker. A modest effort revealed oversights that caused unanticipated
behaviors of the protocol; these were corrected by clarifications and changes to the protocol.
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1. Introduction
Web Services (WS) are meant to overcome the integration problem for heterogeneous distributed applications [3].
A large number of protocols that use the SOAP [12] conventions for message exchange are now under development.
Current and future applications will depend on the correctness of these protocols. As with any distributed system, WS
protocols can permit obscure behaviors that are hard to understand, and it will be difficult to debug them. Since the
dependence on Internet-based systems is increasing dramatically, it is important that these protocols operate correctly.
Our goal is to apply formal methods to the process of standardizing WS protocols. To test our approach, we selected a
non-trivial example—namely, the WS Atomic Transaction protocol [5]. (Two of the authors were involved in designing
the protocol.) Our experience, reported here, shows that writing and model checking a TLA+ specification can help
eliminate errors and ambiguities in a protocol. TLA+can be used to help achieve the reliability required in the design
of a WS protocol standard. We also believe that writing formal specifications can aid in the process of designing WS
protocols.
2. Example: Web Service Atomic Transaction
In a distributed application system, resources like databases and/or caches are accessed by different processes. If
the resources’ state changes must satisfy the well-known ACID properties [8], updates must use a commit protocol.
WS Atomic Transaction (WS-AT) is a protocol designed for this purpose.
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The transaction protocol is begun by an initiator process and controlled by a transaction coordinator. Participant
processes that manage the resources register for the transaction. At some point, the initiator can decide to abort or try to
commit the transaction. Roughly speaking, the goal of the protocol is to guarantee that the initiator and the participants
agree on whether the transaction is committed or aborted.
All of the protocol’s messages go to or from the transaction coordinator. Any communication between the initiator
and the participants is application specific and is not part of the protocol.
WS-AT is based on the well-known two-phase commit (2PC) protocol [1]. However, it has two non-standard
features. The first is the registration procedure. Registration is often ignored in textbook descriptions of 2PC. The
second non-standard feature is that it distinguishes two classes of participants, called volatile and durable, based on
the type of resource that they are expected to manage. A cache is an example of a volatile resource; a conventional
database is a durable resource. The standard 2PC protocol uses two phases, prepare and commit. WS-AT uses three
phases, prepare for volatile participants, prepare for durable participants, and commit. A participant may register any
time before the beginning of the prepare phase for its class. Thus, durable participants can still be registering during
the volatile participants’ prepare phase.
3. Formal specification and TLA+
A WS protocol standard should describe precisely the behavior relevant for interoperability. It should omit internal
implementation details such as when records are written to stable storage. It should permit someone to implement one
of the parties in the protocol without knowing anything about how the other parties are implemented. Therefore, a
standard should be an unambiguous and complete description of the allowed behavior of the protocol’s participants.
WS standards have formal mechanisms to specify the format of XML data structures [13] and service interfaces
[7]. However, they generally do not have methods of precisely specifying the complete behavior of a protocol. They
instead employ informal descriptions of the protocol that can be imprecise, ambiguous, or incomplete; they often fail
to consider unusual cases.
The need for precision and completeness in a standard naturally suggests the use of formal methods. Such methods
use a well-defined language with a precise semantics for writing formal specifications of a protocol’s allowed behaviors.
Tools can be applied to analyze those behaviors and help check the correctness of the protocol.
There is no generally accepted method of formally specifying a WS protocol. State tables that are given in some
specifications are a step in that direction, but they are usually not written as precisely as formal specifications.
TLA+ [11] is a language for writing high-level specifications of concurrent systems. Unlike most specification
languages, it is based on mathematics rather than programming-language constructs. This makes it extremely expressive.
It has no built-in constructs for operations like sending a message, but the language is expressive enough that such
operations are easily defined within a specification. Thus, instead of having to use some particular message passing
semantics built into the language (for example, lossless FIFO delivery), one can specify whatever assumptions one
wants to make about message delivery.
The WS-AT protocol is straightforward enough that it should be easy to describe in any serious specification
language. However, as explained in Section 4 below, there is one place in the specification where what one process
does depends upon the internal state of another process. This can be hard to model in some languages designed expressly
for distributed systems. TLA+ has been used to describe a wide range of concurrent systems, so we are confident of
its ability to specify any desired WS protocol.
Because it is so mathematical, TLA+ seems foreign to most engineers. However, we have found that engineers can
very quickly learn to read TLA+ specifications. Learning to write TLA+ specifications seems to be about as hard as
learning a new programming language.
4. Modeling the protocol in TLA+
In the summer of 2003, we began a small project to write a TLA+ specification of the WS Atomic Transaction
protocol. Two of the authors are researchers experienced in using formal methods; the other two are experts on this
particular protocol, having participated in its design. The project lasted 2 12 months. It was a background activity, so the
actual time spent was not large—perhaps 1 12 man-months. The result of the project was a TLA+ specification of the
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protocol, written by the researchers, and two higher-level specifications, written by the designers with the assistance
of the researchers.
The protocol specification has been read by the designers to determine that it corresponds to their idea of what
the protocol does. It has been checked with the TLC model checker to determine that it is complete (specifies what
should occur on the receipt of any possible message) and that it satisfies the basic correctness property of the protocol
(agreement on the outcome of the transaction).
The researchers were initially given a preliminary version of the official specification [5]. (Its state table was the part
that they found most useful.) They met with the designers three times, and they also asked questions of the designers
by email.
The first task we faced was deciding what kind of specification to write. There is no notion of a “right” specification
of a system. A specification is an abstraction that is meant to serve some purpose. We found that there were basically two
ways to model the protocol. One was to faithfully formalize the description of the protocol in the official specification.
The second was to write a simpler model whose primary goal was to verify the completeness and correctness of the
protocol. We chose the second option. We therefore collapsed multiple states from the official specification’s state table
into single states in the TLA+ specification. This reduced the total number of protocol states, making the specification
easier to check. Other modeling questions that we faced were:
• Whether communication between the initiator and the coordinator should be internal or by messages. The designers
decided it was all right to let it be internal.
• What assumptions should be made about the message-passing infrastructure. The designers decided that the
specification should allow messages to be reordered, lost, and duplicated.
Additional questions arose because some aspects of the protocol were not described clearly enough in the official
specification to permit their formal specification. An important example of this was the registration procedure. The
researchers did not understand why a Register message from a new participant could not arrive after the coordinator
had forgotten all about the transaction. This could not be resolved by inspecting the official specification because
registration is described in a different standard (the WS-Coordination protocol standard [6]). The official specification
did not clearly explain the interaction between these two protocols. We eventually decided to let the TLA+specification
describe the necessary synchronization between registering processes and the coordinator without indicating how it is
achieved. Thus, the specification has an action by one process enabled by a predicate on the state of another process,
without describing how the first process learns about the second process’s state. (This is easily expressed in TLA+, but
would be difficult in a specification language based on communicating automata.)
Most of the effort consisted of resolving these issues, many of which were discovered only while writing the specifica-
tion. The complete specification consists of about 350 lines of TLA+plus 500 lines of comments. Once one understands
what a protocol like WS-AT does and how it should be modeled, actually writing its specification is quite easy.
The specification is well suited to model checking. TLC checked that the basic agreement property is satisfied
by a model containing four participants. For this model, the protocol has about 500,000 reachable states, with its
longest non-repeating behavior containing 45 states. TLC checked it in about 4 14 min on a 2-processor, 2.4 GHz
PC. The protocol is straightforward enough that the specification is highly unlikely to contain any error that would
manifest itself only on a larger model, given the topology of the communication patterns and the indistinguishability
of transaction participants.
Our effort did not reveal any major issues with the core durable 2PC protocol. This was to be expected, since that
part of the protocol is very well understood. However, it did expose several problems with registration and with the
volatile 2PC protocol. The use of the WS-Coordination protocol to control registration within a transaction commit
protocol is new, as is the use of separate volatile and durable 2PC protocols. The interaction of these new features
turned out to be more complicated than expected. Model checking revealed behaviors of the protocol that were not
anticipated by the designers. This led to clarifications and changes to the official specification. In more novel protocols,
unanticipated behaviors usually result in errors.
5. Overview of the TLA+protocol specification
We now present an overview of the specification. The complete TLA+specification, with comments, appears in the
appendix. It is the exact specification we wrote; the only changes we made were to format the comments for typesetting
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and to correct some typos in them. The machine-readable ascii version can be downloaded from the Web [10]. As
explained above, this is not the specification we would have written as part of an official standard.
Recall that the protocol involves an initiator, a transaction coordinator (TC), and a set of participants. The TC
exchanges messages with the participants. As noted above, we modeled the initiator and TC as a single process. The
specification declares the constant parameter Participant , which represents the set of participants.
We specify only the safety properties of the protocol (what is permitted to happen), not its liveness properties (what
must eventually happen). This enables a very simple representation of message passing. A variable msgs represents
the set of all messages that have ever been sent. An action that, in an implementation, would be enabled by the receipt
of certain messages is, in the specification, enabled by the existence of those messages in msgs . Recall that we decided
to allow messages to be lost, duplicated, or received out of order. Since msgs is a set, messages can be received in
any order. Loss of a message is represented by simply not executing that action, even though the action is enabled.
(Because we specify only safety properties, there is no requirement that an enabled action is ever executed.) Duplicate
message delivery is allowed because messages are never removed from msgs , so once a message is in the set, the action
of receiving that message is always enabled.
There are three other variables: iState is a record describing the initiator’s state, tcData is a record describing
the data maintained by the coordinator, and pData is an array, where pData[p] is a record describing the state of
participant p.
Correctness of the protocol is expressed by invariance of the state predicate Consistency . It asserts that the protocol
is not in an inconsistent final or finishing state—that is, where one process thinks the protocol committed and another
thinks it has aborted. It has two separate conjuncts, one asserting what is true if the initiator has reached the committed
state, and the other asserting what is true if a participant has reached the committed state. These two conjuncts are not
logically independent, but we have not eliminated the redundancy in order to make clear what is being asserted.
A TLA+ safety specification has the form Init ∧[Next ]vars , where Init is a predicate describing the initial state,
Next is a formula that describes the next-state relation, and vars is the tuple of specification variables. The bulk of a
specification consists of the definition of Next . Its high-level definition is
Next Δ= TCInternal ∨ TCRcvMsg ∨ PInternal ∨ PRcvMsg
where the four disjuncts have the following meaning:
• TCInternal describes the “spontaneous” steps of the initiator and of the TC—that is, steps not taken in response
to receipt of a message.
• TCRcvMsg describes the response of the TC to receipt of a participant’s message.
• PInternal describes the participants’ spontaneous steps.
• PRcvMsg describes the participants’ responses to a message from the TC.
The initiator does not send or receive explicit messages.
Action TCInternal is defined to be A ∧ (unchanged pData), where A is a disjunction of formulas describing
the different operations performed by the TC or initiator. (An action describes a state change as a relation between the
new and old values of the variables, where a primed occurrence of a variable represents the new value and an unprimed
occurrence represents the old value.)
Action TCRcvMsg has the form ∃m ∈ msgs : B , where B is a disjunction, each disjunct representing the receipt
of a different type of message m . We have written these disjuncts in a rather unusual way. A typical subaction has the
form
(B1 ∧ P1) ∨ · · · ∨ (Bn ∧ Pn)
where the Bi (called the “guards”) are mutually exclusive state predicates and the Pi describe the new values of
variables. If none of the guards is true, then the subaction equals false and no step is possible. To be able to check the
completeness of our specification, we wanted TLC to flag an error if it evaluated this subaction and found none of the
guards true. So, we instead wrote the subaction as
case B1 → P1  · · ·  Bn → Pn
These two expressions have the same meaning if exactly one of the guards is true. But the latter expression is
undefined if none of the guards is true, causing TLC to report an error.
The definitions of PInternal and PRcvMsg are similar, except they involve an additional existential quantification
over the set of participants.
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The specification ends with the definition of Spec, the complete specification, and a theorem asserting the invariance
ofConsistency and ofTypeOK , a state predicate describing the types of the variables. (TLA+is an untyped language.)
This is the theorem that TLC checked.
6. Further work
We have also written two higher-level specifications—a 70-line abstract specification that describes only the
behavior of the initiator and the participants, and an intermediate-level shared-memory specification that also describes
the transaction coordinator but eliminates all messages. We have checked that both of these higher-level specifications
are implemented by the protocol specification described above. (The verification of implementation is explained in
Section 5.8 of [11].)
The purpose of Web services is to provide a framework of interoperable standards that allow the development
of secure and reliable transactional systems and applications. We therefore want to specify not only WS-AT, but
also systems built on top of it. Our abstract specification is useful for this because it is simpler than the complete
specification.
The complete WS-AT protocol specification can be verified quickly on a modern processor. But once this is done,
it does not need to be done again every time a client system is validated. TLC requires 253 seconds to check all
behaviors of the full specification for a system with four participants. But it can check the behaviors of the abstract
specification with four participants in less than 7 seconds. This savings in time, accompanied by a large reduction in
the size of the state space, will allow the checking of client systems on larger models. The procedure can be carried
further by providing abstract specifications of the client systems to permit their clients to be modeled and validated
more efficiently.
The abstract specification simply describes the states that participants may go through in 2PC. It can also be used as
the specification of other protocols. For example, it could be implemented by a commit protocol that uses a different
communication topology than that of WS-AT. If the new protocol satisfied the abstract specification, then a client could
safely use it in place of WS-AT.
Before specifying the fully abstract protocol, we specified its behavior using shared memory. The shared-
memory specification is about the same length as the complete protocol specification. It specifies the
requirements of the WS-AT protocol that are independent of what messages are sent. All the internal data struc-
tures and basic transitions are preserved from the complete protocol specification. This specification was written
by the designers, primarily as a learning exercise. Its only use turned out to be as a stepping stone to the abstract
specification.
During the design of WS-AtomicTransaction, there was a great deal of discussion about the details of the protocol’s
messages. The shared-memory specification, in conjunction with a detailed design, would have helped to clarify the
issues. It would have provided a quick test of whether a proposed change to the specification impacted the semantics,
or if it was merely a different way of expressing the same basic protocol.
The higher-level specifications can also be used for explanation and experimentation. The two parts of any design
activity are determining what to build and how to build it. These two parts form the two levels of a design—namely, the
requirements and the detailed design. Each level informs the other through an iterative design activity. TLA+provides
a lingua franca that can be used to specify both levels precisely. The TLC model checker can automatically verify
that the detailed design satisfies the requirements. This allows changes in the design to be checked quickly for their
impact on the requirements. Model checking can also show how changing the requirements affects the current detailed
design.
Two-phase commit is very well established and well understood, so with WS-AT it was clear from the beginning
what we were building. With other new systems, this is often not the case. The requirements develop along with
the detailed design. As soon as users have a clear understanding of what a system actually does, they think of new
applications—many with new requirements. Any tool that increases the amount, fidelity, or speed of this feedback
accelerates the design process.
Our approach was also used with the WS-BusinessActivity (WS-BA) protocol [4]. Its original specification con-
tained state diagrams and prose descriptions of the transitions between the states. To clarify the second version, the
specification’s authors moved much of the protocol logic into state tables, as had already been done for the WS-AT
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protocol. WS-BA is a new protocol that is not as well understood as 2PC. To assure that the protocol behaved as
expected, we wrote a TLA+ specification. It took only two hours to write the initial specification that checked safety
properties. Since then, we have checked liveness and used WS-BA to experiment with factoring formal specifications
and refinement mappings between them.
As part of a larger effort, 15 formal specifications were written for Web services protocols. Nine of the specifications
were in TLA+, five were in an Abstract State Machine Language [9], and one was in a tool specifically for validating
XML security protocols [2]. These specifications helped discover ambiguities that might have resulted in flaws in
production code. We are in the process of understanding how we can leverage this investment to improve quality
throughout the software lifecycle.
7. Conclusion
The WS-AT official specification contains a great deal of detail that is not captured in the TLA+ specification. It
very carefully describes data formats and some messaging interfaces. These are details of the protocol that are ignored
by the TLA+ specification, which describes only its behavioral properties. Such details are straightforward and fairly
non-controversial.
The TLA+specification therefore describes the part of the protocol that is generally left imprecise in current speci-
fications, and ignores those aspects of the protocol that are already specified quite precisely. TLA+ thus complements
the approach taken in most existing standards. Having a TLA+ specification can help prevent incompatibility among
different implementations.
A precise description of a proposed standard can also help avoid misunderstanding among the writers of the standard.
In a standards committee, discussions can become very abstract. It is easy for different people to interpret statements
in different ways. A mathematical formula is unambiguous.
Writing formal specifications can help in designing a protocol. Being able to check quickly if a protocol specifica-
tion satisfies a more abstract specification can speed the design process. A high-level specification of the protocol’s
requirements can also be used to check the correctness of a protocol’s clients.
TLA+is a particularly good language for writing standards because it is based on ordinary mathematics. This makes
its semantics particularly simple, since the semantics of a specification language is, by definition, a translation into
mathematics of specifications written in the language. As one engineer said about TLA+, “If I want to find out what
an expression means, I can look it up in a math book.”
Appendix
The TLA+specification
Below is the TLA+ specification. Since our primary aim is to describe the specification process rather than the
protocol itself, we present the specification just as we actually wrote and used it. We have made only the following
changes:
• We added formatting commands to the comments to make them easier to read in this typeset version.
• Several lines of the specification were split to keep them from extending past the margin.
The formatting of the actual ascii specification was performed automatically by the TLATEX program [11].
TLA+ is based on ordinary mathematics—that is, predicate logic and simple set theory. It borrows some concepts
and notation from programming, such as records and an if/then/else construct. Almost all its notation is explained in
the tables on pages 268–269 of [11]. Perhaps the most unusual convention of TLA+ is that a list of expressions bulleted
by ∧ or ∨ represents their conjunction or disjunction, with indentation used to eliminate parentheses. (This makes
large formulas easier to read.) The symbol Δ= means is defined to equal. As mentioned above, actions are written as
relations between the new/primed values of the variables and their old/unprimed values. The formula unchanged f
asserts that the old and new values of f are equal.
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module WSAtomicTransaction
extends TLC
This is a preliminary version of a formal specification of the Web Services Atomic Transaction protocol, described
in the document by Cabrera et al. We are specifying the safety property of the protocol (what is allowed to happen),
not its liveness property (what must eventually happen).
The protocol involves an initiator, a transaction coordinator (TC), and a set of participants. The TC exchanges
messages with the participants. For convenience, we assume that the initiator and TC are actually executed on the
same processor, so they can be considered to be a single process.
The protocol allows messages to be lost, duplicated, or received out of order. A process is therefore free to resend
a message at any time. An implementation will resend a message if it times out without receiving a reply. Such
resending is not described explicitly in the specification. Instead, we represent the communication infrastructure by a
set msgs of all messages that have ever been sent. Since resending a sent message does not change the specification’s
state, it is allowed by our specification.
An action that, in an implementation, would be enabled by the receipt of certain messages is here enabled by the
existence of those messages in msgs . Loss of a message is represented by simply not executing that action, even
though it is enabled. This works because we are specifying only safety properties, so there is no requirement that an
enabled action is ever executed.
Since messages are never removed from msgs , receipt of the same message twice is allowed. This can happen in
an implementation either because the communication infrastructure delivers a duplicate copy, or because the sender
mistakenly believed the original copy had been lost and resent the message. In most cases, the specification says
that such duplicate copies are ignored because the response has already been sent, so msgs already contains the
response. However, in an implementation, receipt of a duplicate message may indicate that the sender resent the
message because it never received the response. Hence, an implementation would resend the response.
The constant and variables sections define constant parameters and variables.
constant Participant The set of all participants.
variables iState, The state of the initiator.
tcData, The data maintained by the coordinator.
pData, pData[p] is the data maintained by participant p.
msgs The set of all sent messages.
Message Δ=
The set of all possible messages. A message sent from the TC to a participant has a dest field indicating its
destination. A message from a participant to the TC has a src field indicating its sender. A participant’s Register
message also has a reg field indicating if it’s registering as volatile or durable.
[type : {“RegisterResponse”, “Prepare”, “Commit”, “Rollback”},
dest : Participant ]
∪ [type : {“Prepared”, “ReadOnly”, “Committed”, “Aborted”},
src : Participant ]
∪ [type : {“Register”},
reg : {“volatile”, “durable”},
src : Participant ]
TypeOK Δ=
The type-correctness invariant, indicating the possible values that can be assumed by the variables.
∧ iState ∈ {“active”, “committed”, “aborted”, “completing”}
Because we are assuming that the initiator and the TC are the same process, there is no need for the initiator to
have a separate “aborting” state. Once the decision to abort has been made by the TC, the initiator knows that
the transaction is aborted.
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For convenience, we ignore the action in which the initiator registers the transaction with the TC. Instead, we
assume that the initiator and TC begin in the “active” state. We also assume that the initiator never forgets the
outcome. (In an implementation, the initiator can forget about the transaction as soon as it knows the outcome.
It is forgetting by the TC that’s tricky.)
∧ tcData ∈
[st : {“active”, “preparingVolatile”, “preparingDurable”,
“aborting”, “committing”},
reg : [Participant → {“unregistered”, “volatile”, “durable”,
“prepared”, “readOnly”, “committed”}]]
∪ [st : {“ended”},
res : {“committed”, “aborted”}]
tcData has an st component that indicates the TC’s state. While the TC is performing the transaction, tcData
also has a reg field such that tcData.reg [p] indicates the TC’s knowledge of the state of participant p. The
TC enters the “ended” state when it forgets about the transaction. For convenience in understanding the
protocol, when tcData = “ended”, we let tcData have a res component that indicates the outcome (whether
the transaction committed or aborted). No TC actions depend on the value of tcData.res .
Note: The document Web Services Atomic Transaction Commit lists a Preparing and a PreparedSuccess
state. We have split the Preparing state into “preparingVolatile”, entered initially, and “preparingDurable”,
entered after all volatile participants have prepared. We have eliminated the PreparedSuccess state that is an
internal state, not visible to other processes. We model the protocol by having the TC go directly from the
“preparingDurable” state into either the “Committing” or “Aborting” state. (An implementation is free to split
any of our specification’s states into substates.)
∧ pData ∈ [Participant → [st : {“unregistered”, “prepared”}]
∪
[st : {“registering”, “active”, “preparing”},
reg : {“volatile”, “durable”}]
∪ [st : {“ended”},
res : {“?”, “committed”, “aborted”}]]
pData[p] is the data maintained by participant p. It contains an st field indicating the participant’s state. When
in the “registering” or “active” state, there is also a reg field indicating if the participant is volatile or durable.
When a registered participant forgets about the transaction, it enters the “ended” state.
To help us understand the protocol, when pData[p].st = “ended”, there is a field pData[p].res that indicates
the participant’s knowledge of the outcome when it forgot about the transaction. The value “?” indicates that
the participant was read-only, so it didn’t learn the outcome.
Note that the document Web Services Atomic Transaction Commit does not distinguish between the “unregis-
tered” and “registering” state, which it lumps with the “ended” state into a single None state. The document
also has Prepared and PreparedSuccess states that we have combined into the single “prepared” state. Those
states are not visible externally (that is, by the TC) as different states. (An implementation is free to split any of
our specification’s states into substates.) We might have lumped the “preparing” and “prepared” states together
as well, but it seems convenient to keep them separated because of the interaction of preparing and registration
of durable participants.
We have also eliminated the committing and aborting states, having the participant immediately forget the
transaction by going to the “ended” state. In a similar way, we could have eliminated the “aborting” state of
the TC, but didn’t for no good reason. Perhaps we will in the next version.
∧ msgs ⊆ Message
msgs equals a set of messages.
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Consistency Δ=
A predicate that implies that the protocol is not in an inconsistent final or finishing state—that is, where one process
thinks the protocol committed and another thinks it has aborted. There are two separate conjuncts, one asserting
what’s true if the initiator has reached the “committed” state, and the other asserting what’s true if a participant
has reached the “committed” state. These two conjuncts are not logically independent, but we have not eliminated
the redundancy in order to make it clear what is being asserted. The invariance of this predicate is the correctness
property that we check.
∧ (iState = “committed”)
⇒ ∨ ∧ tcData.st = “ended”
∧ tcData.res = “committed”
∧ ∀ p ∈ Participant :
∨ pData[p].st = “unregistered”
∨ ∧ pData[p].st = “ended”
∧ pData[p].res ∈ {“?”, “committed”}
∨ ∧ tcData.st = “committing”
∧ ∀ p ∈ Participant :
∨ pData[p].st ∈ {“unregistered”, “prepared”}
∨ ∧ pData[p].st = “ended”
∧ pData[p].res ∈ {“?”, “committed”}
∧ ∀ p ∈ Participant :
∧ pData[p].st = “ended”
∧ pData[p].res = “committed”
⇒ ∧ iState = “committed”
∧ ∨ ∧ tcData.st = “ended”
∧ tcData.res = “committed”
∧ iState = “committed”
∨ tcData.st = “committing”
∧ ∀ pp ∈ Participant :
∨ pData[pp].st ∈ {“unregistered”, “prepared”}
∨ ∧ pData[pp].st = “ended”
∧ pData[pp].res ∈ {“?”, “committed”}
Init Δ=
The initial predicate.
∧ iState = “active”
∧ tcData = [st → “active”,
reg → [p ∈ Participant → “unregistered”]]
∧ pData = [p ∈ Participant → [st → “unregistered”]]
∧ msgs = {}
THE ACTIONS
The next-state action is the disjunction of the four actions TCInternal , TCRcvMsg , PInternal , and PRcvMsg . The
major part of the specification consists of the definitions of these four actions, which follow.
TCInternal Δ=
This action describes the actions of the initiator and the internal actions of the TC—that is, the actions of the initiator
prompted by timeouts or by a spontaneous action of the initiator. It also describes actions enabled by the TC having
received enough messages. (Those actions could be described as occurring when the TC receives the last message
needed to enable it, but it’s more convenient to let it be done as a separate internal action.)
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∧ ∨ The initiator decides to commit the transaction. It sets its state to “completing”. At the same time, the TC
sets its state to “preparingVolatile” and sends Prepare messages to every participant that has registered as
volatile.
∧ iState = “active”
∧ ∀ p ∈ Participant :
(pData[p].st = “registering”) ⇒
∧ pData[p].reg = “durable”
∧ ∃ pp ∈ Participant :
∧ pData[pp].st ∈ {“active”, “preparing”}
∧ pData[pp].reg = “volatile”
The only participants that may be registering are durable ones that are being installed by a volatile participant
that is not yet prepared. It is up to the application to ensure that this condition is met.
∧ iState ′ = “completing”
∧ tcData ′ = [tcData except !.st = “preparingVolatile”]
∧ msgs ′ = msgs ∪ [type : {“Prepare”},
dest : {p ∈ Participant :
tcData.reg [p] = “volatile”}]
∨ Either the initiator decides to abort the transaction while in its “active” state, or else the TC decides to abort it
while in a “preparing” state—presumably because of some timeout. The initiator’s state is set to “aborted”,
the TC state is set to “aborting”, and Rollback messages are sent to every registered participant from which
the TC did not already receive a ReadOnly message.
∧ ∨ iState = “active”
∨ tcData.st ∈ {“preparingVolatile”, “preparingDurable”}
∧ iState ′ = “aborted”
∧ tcData ′ = [tcData except !.st = “aborting”]
∧ msgs ′ = msgs ∪ [type : {“Rollback”},
dest : {p ∈ Participant :
tcData.reg [p] /∈ {“unregistered”,
“readOnly”}}]
∨ The TC ends the volatile prepare and begins the durable prepare. It does this when it has received Prepared
or ReadOnly messages from every participant that registered as volatile, and it sends Prepare message to
every participant that registered as durable.
∧ tcData.st = “preparingVolatile”
∧ ∀ p ∈ Participant : tcData.reg [p] /= “volatile”
∧ tcData ′ = [tcData except !.st = “preparingDurable”]
∧ msgs ′ = msgs ∪ [type : {“Prepare”},
dest : {p ∈ Participant :
tcData.reg [p] = “durable”}]
∧ unchanged iState
∨ The TC finishes the durable prepare and decides to commit the transaction. It can do this when it has received
a Prepared or ReadOnly message from every durable participant. It sets its state to “committing”, notifies
the initiator that the transaction has committed, and sends Commit messages to every participant that replied
with a Prepared message (instead of a ReadOnly message).
∧ tcData.st = “preparingDurable”
∧ ∀ p ∈ Participant : tcData.reg [p] /= “durable”
∧ tcData ′ = [tcData except !.st = “committing”]
∧ msgs ′ = msgs ∪ [type : {“Commit”},
dest : {p ∈ Participant :
tcData.reg [p] = “prepared”}]
∧ iState ′ = “committed”
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∨ The action by which the TC forgets the transaction, entering the “ended” state. It can do this if it is in the
“aborting” state, or if it is in the “committing” state and has received a ReadOnly or Committed message
from every registered participant.
∧ ∨ tcData.st = “aborting”
∨ ∧ tcData.st = “committing”
∧ ∀ p ∈ Participant :
tcData.reg [p] ∈ {“unregistered”, “readOnly”, “committed”}
∧ tcData ′ = [st → “ended”,
res → if tcData.st = “aborting” then “aborted”
else “committed”]
∧ unchanged 〈iState, msgs〉
∧ unchanged pData
The participants’ states are left unchanged.
The following action definition uses the TLA+ construct
case B1 → P1  · · ·  Bn → Pn
This construct is used here (and in most places) when the state predicates Bi , which are called the “guards”, are
mutually disjoint—that is, no two of them can be true in the same state. When the guards are mutually disjoint,
the case expression equals Pi if guard Bi is true. If none of the guards are true, then the value of the expression
is undefined. If TLC ever evaluates such an undefined expression, it reports an error. Thus, this case statement is
equivalent to the formula
(B1 ∧ P1) ∨ · · · ∨ (Bn ∧ Pn)
except that when none of the guards are true, the formula equals false while the value of the case statement is
undefined.
In the following action, the guards of each case formula describe all the possible cases in which the TC can receive
a particular message.
TCRcvMsg Δ=
The action in which the TC receives a message from a participant.
∃m ∈ msgs :
m is the message being received.
let Reply(tp) Δ= msgs ′ = msgs ∪ {[type → tp, dest → m.src]}
Locally defines Reply(tp) to be the action of sending a message of type tp to the sender of message m .
HaveSent(tp) Δ=
∃mm ∈ msgs : (mm.type = tp) ∧ (mm.dest = m.src)
Locally defines HaveSent(tp) to be true iff the TC has sent a message of type tp to the sender of m .
in ∨ m is a Register message.
∧ m.type = “Register”
∧ case The normal case, in which the TC state is either “active”, or else this is a durable participant
registering while the TC is performing the volatile prepare.
∨ tcData.st = “active”
∨ ∧ tcData.st = “preparingVolatile”
∧ m.reg = “durable”
→ The TC sends a RegisterResponse reply to the sender, and sets the appropriate tcData.reg
component (the one corresponding to the sender) to the contents of the reg field of m .
∧ Reply(“RegisterResponse”)
∧ tcData ′ = [tcData except !.reg [m.src] = m.reg ]
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 If the TC is in a “preparing” or “committing” state or has forgotten the transaction, then m is
a duplicate message to which the TC has already responded and so is ignored.
∧ ∨ ∧ tcData.st = “preparingVolatile”
∧ m.reg = “volatile”




 If the TC is in the “aborting” state, then if the sender is not already registered, then the decision
to abort was made before the sender could register, in which case aRollback message is sent. (Is
this correct?) Otherwise, this is a duplicate message to which the TC has already responded,
and it has already sent a Rollback message to the sender (unless the participant responded
ReadOnly to a Prepare message).
∧ tcData.st = “aborting”
∧ ∨ tcData.reg [m.src] ∈ {“unregistered”, “readOnly”}








 If the TC is in the “ended” state, then either the transaction has been aborted before the sender
had a chance to register, or else the Register message is old and, if it was committed, then
the sender has already forgotten the transaction and hence will ignore any message it receives.
Therefore, it’s safe to send a Rollback message.
∧ tcData.st = “ended”
∧ ∨ tcData.res = “aborted”




∧ unchanged 〈iState, pData〉
The initiator’s state and the participants’ data are not changed.
∨ m is a "Prepared" message.
∧ m.type = “Prepared”
∧ case The normal case, in which the TC has sent a Prepare message and is waiting for the sender’s
reply.
∨ ∧ tcData.st = “preparingVolatile”
∧ tcData.reg [m.src] = “volatile”
∨ ∧ tcData.st = “preparingDurable”
∧ tcData.reg [m.src] = “durable”
→
∧ tcData ′ = [tcData except !.reg [m.src] = “prepared”]
∧ unchanged msgs
 The TC has forgotten the transaction.
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tcData.st = “ended”
→
The TC sends a Rollback reply to the sender. The transaction could either have aborted or
committed. However, if the transaction has committed, then the sender will know that it has and




If the TC is either in a “preparing” state, or in the “aborting” or “committing” state, then it has
already received and acted on a copy of m , so it does nothing.
∨ ∧ tcData.st ∈ {“preparingVolatile”, “preparingDurable”}
∧ tcData.reg [m.src] = “prepared”
∨ ∧ tcData.st = “aborting”
∧ HaveSent(“Rollback”)




∧ unchanged 〈iState, pData〉
The initiator’s state is not changed.
∨ m is a ReadOnly message.
∧ m.type = “ReadOnly”
∧ case The normal case, in which the TC has sent a Prepare message and is waiting for the sender’s
reply.
∨ ∧ tcData.st = “preparingVolatile”
∧ tcData.reg [m.src] = “volatile”
∨ ∧ tcData.st = “preparingDurable”
∧ tcData.reg [m.src] = “durable”
→
The TC sets its tcData.reg component corresponding to the sender to “readOnly”.
∧ tcData ′ = [tcData except !.reg [m.src] = “readOnly”]
∧ unchanged msgs
 If the TC has forgotten the transaction, then either m is a duplicate message, or else it was
decided to abort the transaction before the TC received the response to the Prepare message




 In the following cases, m is a duplicate of a message that the TC has already received and it is
ignored.
∨ ∧ tcData.st ∈ {“preparingVolatile”, “preparingDurable”}
∧ tcData.reg [m.src] = “readOnly”
∨ ∧ tcData.st = “aborting”
∧ ∨ tcData.reg [m.src] = “readOnly”
∨ ∧ tcData.reg [m.src] ∈ {“volatile”, “durable”}
∧ HaveSent(“Rollback”)
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∨ tcData.st = “committing”
→
unchanged 〈tcData, msgs〉
∧ unchanged 〈iState, pData〉
The initiator’s state and the participants’ data are not changed.
∨ m is an "Aborted" message.
∧ m.type = “Aborted”
∧ case The normal case, in which the TC receives the message when it is “active” or in a “preparing”
state and the sender has not replied to a Prepare message. In this case, the transaction is
aborted, the TC sends Rollback messages to all registered participants from which it has not




∧ tcData.reg [m.src] ∈
{“unregistered”, “volatile”, “durable”}
→
∧ iState ′ = “aborted”
∧ tcData ′ = [tcData except !.st = “aborting”]
∧ msgs ′ = msgs ∪
[type : {“Rollback”},
dest : {p ∈ Participant :
tcData.reg [p] /∈
{“unregistered”, “readOnly”}}]
11 Dec 2003: changed “ReadOnly” to “readOnly”, correcting typo found by Colin
Campbell.
∧ unchanged pData
 If the TC is already in the “aborting” state or it has forgotten an aborted transaction, then the
TC has already sent a Rollback message to the sender (perhaps because m is a duplicate of a
message the TC already received). If the TC has forgotten a committed transaction, then this
Aborted message was sent because the sender received an obsolete Prepare message after it
had forgotten the transaction. In either case, m is ignored.
∧ ∨ tcData.st = “aborting”
∨ ∧ tcData.st = “ended”
∧ ∨ ∧ tcData.res = “aborted”
∧ HaveSent(“Rollback”)
∨ ∧ tcData.res = “committed”
∧ pData[m.src].st = “ended”
∧ pData[m.src].res = “committed”
→
unchanged 〈tcData, pData, iState, msgs〉
 If the TC is in the “committing” or “ended” state, or it is in a preparing state and the sender
has already responded to the Prepared message, then the message is ignored. (It could have
been sent in response to a duplicate Prepared message after the participant had reached the
“ended” state.)
∧ ∨ tcData.st ∈ {“committing”, “ended”}
∨ ∧ tcData.st ∈ {“active”, “preparingVolatile”,
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“preparingDurable”}
∧ tcData.reg [m.src] ∈ {“prepared”, “readOnly”,
“committed”}
→
unchanged 〈tcData, pData, iState, msgs〉
∨ m is a Committed message.
∧ m.type = “Committed”
∧ case The normal case, in which the TC is in the “committing” state. In this case, it sets the element
of tcData.reg corresponding to the sender to “committed”.
tcData.st = “committing”
→
tcData ′ = [tcData except !.reg [m.src] = “committed”]
 If the TC has forgotten the transaction, then the transaction has been committed and m is
ignored.
∧ tcData.st = “ended”
∧ tcData.res = “committed”
→
unchanged tcData
∧ unchanged 〈iState, pData, msgs〉
The initiator’s state and the participants’ data are unchanged, and no messages are sent.
PInternal Δ=
This action describes the internal actions of the participants—actions that occur “spontaneously”, either prompted
by timeouts or, as in the case of the register action, by some communication external to the protocol.
∃ p ∈ Participant :
p is the participant performing the action.
let SendMsg(tp) Δ= msgs ′ = msgs ∪ {[type → tp, src → p]}
SendRegisterMsg(rg) Δ= msgs ′ = msgs ∪ {[type → “Register”,
src → p,
reg → rg ]}
Locally defined action expressions. SendMsg(tp) sends a message of type tp from participant p to the
TC. SendRegisterMsg(rg) sends a Register rg message, where rg is either “durable” or “volatile”.
in ∨ p registers as a volatile participant. It can do this only if it is unregistered and the initiator is in the “active”
state.
∧ pData[p].st = “unregistered”
∧ iState = “active”
∧ pData ′ = [pData except ![p] = [st → “registering”,
reg → “volatile”]]
∧ SendRegisterMsg(“volatile”)
∧ unchanged 〈iState, tcData〉
∨ p registers as a durable participant. It can do this only if it is unregistered and, if either the initiator is
in the “active” state, or there is some volatile participant that is willing to wait for p to register before
preparing. Since we don’t model “willingness to wait”, we allow the participant to register as long as
there is some volatile participant that can wait for it.
∧ pData[p].st = “unregistered”
∧ ∨ iState = “active”
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∨ ∃ pp ∈ Participant :
∧ pData[pp].st ∈ {“active”, “preparing”}
∧ pData[pp].reg = “volatile”
∧ pData ′ = [pData except ![p] = [st → “registering”,
reg → “durable”]]
∧ SendRegisterMsg(“durable”)
∧ unchanged 〈iState, tcData〉
∨ p spontaneously aborts and forgets about the transaction. We do not allow it to abort in the “registering”
state. If we allowed this, then we could wind up with a situation in which a participant aborted before
it registered, and the transaction committed anyway. In practice, there will have to be some way for a
participant to give up when it hasn’t received a RegisterResponse message. However, to do this, it must
learn from the initiator or a volatile participant that the transaction aborted so it can forget about it. Since
we are not modeling this kind of inter-participant communication, we do not model this procedure.
∧ pData[p].st ∈ {“active”, “preparing”}
∧ pData ′ = [pData except ![p] = [st → “ended”,
res → “aborted”]]
∧ SendMsg(“Aborted”)
∧ unchanged 〈iState, tcData〉
∨ p either prepares or becomes read-only. If p is volatile, then it cannot do this if there is a durable
participant that is in the “registering” state, and there is no other volatile participant to wait for it to
register.
∧ pData[p].st = “preparing”
∧ ∨ pData[p].reg = “durable”
∨ ¬∃ dp ∈ Participant : ∧ pData[dp].st = “registering”
∧ pData[dp].reg = “durable”
∨ ∃ vp ∈ Participant \ {p} : ∧ pData[vp].st = “active”
∧ pData[vp].reg = “volatile”
11 Dec 03 : Colin Campbell observed that the “{p}”
is unnecessary. It should probably be removed.
∧ ∨ ∧ pData ′ = [pData except ![p] = [st → “prepared”]]
∧ SendMsg(“Prepared”)
∨ ∧ pData ′ = [pData except ![p] = [st → “ended”,
res → “?”]]
∧ SendMsg(“ReadOnly”)
∧ unchanged 〈iState, tcData〉
PRcvMsg Δ=
The action in which a participant receives a message from the TC.
∃m ∈ msgs :
m is the message being received.
let Reply(tp) Δ= msgs ′ = msgs ∪ {[type → tp, src → m.dest ]}
Locally defines Reply(tp) to be the action of sending a message of type tp from the sender of message m .
HaveSent(tp) Δ=
∃mm ∈ msgs : (mm.type = tp) ∧ (mm.src = m.dest)
Locally defines HaveSent(tp) to be true iff the participant receiving m has sent a message of type tp to
the TC.
in ∧ ∨ m is a RegisterResponse message
∧ m.type = “RegisterResponse”
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∧ case The normal case.
pData[m.dest ].st = “registering”
→
∧ pData ′ = [pData except ![m.dest ].st = “active”]
∧ unchanged msgs
 This is a duplicate of an already-received message, or else it is ignorable because another
message to the participant arrived ahead of it.
pData[m.dest ].st ∈
{“active”, “preparing”, “prepared”, “ended”}
→
unchanged 〈pData, msgs〉
∨ m is a Prepare message.
∧ m.type = “Prepare”
∧ This is either the normal case (the participant is in the “active” state), or else this Prepare
message has arrived before the RegisterResponse message.
case pData[m.dest ].st ∈ {“registering”, “active”}
→ ∧ pData ′ = [pData except ![m.dest ].st = “preparing”]
∧ unchanged msgs
 This is a duplicate of a message already received.
pData[m.dest ].st ∈ {“preparing”, “prepared”}
→
unchanged 〈pData, msgs〉
 The transaction has been forgotten. The participant responds with an Aborted message—
even though the transaction might have committed or be in the process of committing. In
the latter case, the Aborted message will be ignored by the TC.
∧ pData[m.dest ].st = “ended”
∧ ∨ ∧ pData[m.dest ].res = “committed”
∧ HaveSent(“Committed”)
∨ ∧ pData[m.dest ].res = “aborted”
∧ ∨ HaveSent(“Aborted”)
∨ ∧ tcData.st = “ended”
∧ tcData.res = “committed”





∨ m is a Commit message.
∧ m.type = “Commit”
∧ The normal case.
case pData[m.dest ].st = “prepared”
→
∧ pData ′ =
[pData except ![m.dest ] = [st → “ended”,
res → “committed”]]
∧ Reply(“Committed”)
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 The transaction has ended, so this must be a message that was already received.
∧ pData[m.dest ].st = “ended”
∧ pData[m.dest ].res ∈ {“?”, “committed”}
→
unchanged 〈pData, msgs〉
∨ m is a Rollback message.
∧ m.type = “Rollback”
∧ The participant can be in any registered state. If it hasn’t ended, then this causes it to abort. It
also sends an Aborted message to the TC. This message isn’t needed, but it is apparently used
as an acknowledgement.
case pData[m.dest ].st ∈
{“registering”, “active”, “preparing”, “prepared”}
→
∧ pData ′ =
[pData except ![m.dest ] = [st → “ended”,
res → “aborted”]]
∧ Reply(“Aborted”)
 If the participant has already finished, then this is ignored. It is possible for this message to
arrive even though the participant has ended by committing the transaction. In this case, the
Rollback message was generated by a duplicate Register message arriving at the TC after
it had forgotten the transaction.
pData[m.dest ].st = “ended”
→
unchanged 〈pData, msgs〉
∧ unchanged 〈iState, tcData〉
Next Δ= TCInternal ∨ TCRcvMsg ∨ PInternal ∨ PRcvMsg
The specification’s next-state action.
vars Δ= 〈iState, tcData, pData, msgs〉
The tuple of all variables.
Spec Δ= Init ∧[Next ]vars
The complete spec of the two-phase commit protocol.
theorem Spec ⇒ (TypeOK ∧ Consistency)
This theorem asserts that the predicates TypeOK and Consistency are invariants of the specification. TLC checked
this with 4 participants. It generated 10269919 states; 504306 of them were distinct. The longest non-repeating
behavior had 45 states. It took TLC about 4-1/4 minutes on a 2-processor, 2.4GHz machine.
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